Tree enterprises and bankruptcy ventures: a game theoretic similarity due to a graph theoretic proof

In a tree enterprise, users reside at the nodes of the tree and their aim is to connect themselves, directly or indirectly, to the root of the tree. The construction costs of arcs of the tree are given by means of the arc-cost-function associated with the tree. Further the bankruptcy venture is described in terms of the estate of the bankrupt firm and the claims of the various creditors. The first objective of the paper is to provide conditions (on the claims and the surplus of the claims in the bankruptcy venture) which are sufficient and necessary for the bankruptcy venture to agree with some tree enterprise. It is established that the bankruptcy venture agrees with some tree enterprise if and only if the surplus of claims in the bankruptcy venture is at most the size of the second smallest claim (in the weak sense). For that purpose, both the tree enterprise as well as the bankruptcy venture are modelled as a cooperative game with transferable utility. Within the framework of cooperative game theory, the proof of the equivalence theorem concerning the tree enterprise game and the bankruptcy game, under the given circumstances, is based on graph-theoretic tools in a tree structure. As an adjunct to the proof of the equivalence theorem, the solution concept of the nucleolus for specific tree enterprises is determine

Associated consistency and values for TU games

In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in order to axiomatize such values with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. The latter axiom requires that the solutions of the initial game and its associated game (with the same player set, but a different characteristic function) coincide. \u

A survey of consistency properties in cooperative game theory

The main purpose of this survey paper is to review the axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value, the prekernel, the prenucleolus, and the core by means of a consistency property in terms of the reduced games. Whenever possible, new results and new proofs are addded

Semiproportional Values for TU Games.

The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two- person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure com- posed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.cooperative TU game; value; proportional sharing; probabilistic model

On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games

The situation, in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies, is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-insurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper we show that a co-insurance game possesses several interesting properties that allow to study the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and to construct an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus

A Weighted Pseudo-potential Approach to Values for TU-games

This paper provides a twofold generalization of the well-known characterization of the Shapley value for TU-games as the discrete gradient of a so-called potential function. On the one hand the potential approach is extended to the so-called weighted pseudo-potential approach in the sense that the extended representation may incorporate, besides a fraction of the discrete gradient, a fraction of the underlying pseudo-potential function itself, as well as a fraction of the average of all the components of the gradient. On the other hand the paper fully characterizes the class of values for TU-games that admit a weighted pseudo-potential representation. Besides two individual constraints, these values have to be efficient, symmetric, and linear. The theory developed is illustrated by several examples of such values and their weighted pseudo-potential representations are discussed